1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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361 coastal to the inland cities. The streets are
369 sometimes paved, and schools, newspapers, motion pictures, and radio make the people more aware of the outside world than are their cousins in the towns and villages. In Shanghai and other modern cities, major industries built large dormitories for workers, labor unions and political clubs developed as new foci for society activity. World War II brought a measure of industrial life to the Southwest. Yet the living conditions grew worse as workers
161 moved into the cities. Crowding reached un-
361 believable proportions. The figures for Chengtu suggest the dimensions of this problem in all urban centers. Chengtu, with predominately one-storied buildings, had a population density of 50,000 per square mile as compared to 22,500 per square mile in New
• [44] York City.[13] One survey suggests that workers in the newer industries were somewhat better off than workers in the traditional trades,[14] but their traditional holidays were shortened without, in most cases, the introduction of a
369 six-day week. In the crowded cities the festivals
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13. Winfield, op. cit., p. 88. These figures would seem to be for the period 1945-47.

14. Lang, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

565 of these benefits are limited and there have been
184 only a small number of beneficiaries.

565 On the liability side of the Communist policy
466 toward the worker are: the lack of substantial
184 increase in the standard of living, a harsher work schedule and loss of leisure time, and growing disillusionment as it becomes obvious that the "proletariat" has not really become the master of the New China. The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against overwork and overly rigid demands upon the time and temper of the laborer indicate that the laboring class is not necessarily most productive under pressure. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new, Communist-fostered managerial class, which, for whatever reasons, receives more benefits than does manual labor.

565 Foreign advisers had been employed in many
648 Chinese factories in pre-Communist days, and many workers may have become accustomed to recognizing the general excellence of Western technology. However, any government effort to impose foreign leadership in technical fields may injure the pride of the worker and provoke his resentment. There is no evidence to suggest that many Russian technicians or advisers are employed in factories in this region, or that those employed have caused resentment among the native workers.

578 process, each level of government has a particular target in mind and exerts influence on the next lower political echelon to achieve that objective. The result is an accumulation of pressure at the base of the political pyramid.

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466 In the economic field, each factory is given a production quota, assigned through a similar chain-of-command method. To fulfill the quota, every possible means of control is resorted to. The pressure engendered is constant. Both management and labor are held directly responsible for the attainment of assigned quotas. Failure to meet them means severe penalties. Recently, the Communists have attempted to improve their system of checking on the fulfillment of production quotas in order to eliminate the practice of submitting false reports of production achievements -- a strategy attempted in an effort to gain some temporary relief from mounting pressures.

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578 Within the Party itself, pressure and tension are most intense. In the first place, the Party apparatus as the center of power and activity of the regime is subject to pressure by both the Party and the state. Secondly,

467 constituted about 0.05 per cent of the total number of industrial workers in all China, although the population of the region accounts for 16.9 per cent of the population of the whole country. Of the 177,670 industrial workers, only 25,538 (14.37%) were unionized at the time the report was published.[1]

After three years' work on labor organization and the development of industry, the new regime announced in June 1952 that 35,259 basic trade unions (unions formed in individual factories, mines, and other enterprises) had been formed in the region.[2] The number of unionized industrial workers was reported to have increased from 25, 538 to 640,846, and the total of all unionized wage earners was set at 1,405,706.

438 466 However, in mid-1952, about 80 per cent of the industrial output of Southwest China was still turned out by handcraft methods in small shops throughout the region.[3] Old fashioned workshops and some of the semi-modern factories continued to rely heavily on apprentices for labor. The

1. Chung-kuo Kung-jen [Chinese Worker Monthly], Peking, June 15, 1950, p. 69.
2. Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 1.
3. Chung-kuo Ch'ing-kung-yeh [China's Light Industry], Peking, May 1952, pp. 21-24.

438 466 treatment of apprentices under the new regime still largely followed the old customs in Southwest China. The working hours of the apprentice were almost unrestricted; his earnings seldom amounted to more than 35 lbs. of rice per month. Since the trade union and labor insurance laws promulgated by the Communist government did not cover the apprentices, they had neither organization nor security. After a three year apprenticeship, they entered the labor market as unskilled labor.[4]

467 Chungking is the industrial and commercial center of Southwest China. As a result, almost all regional reports concerning organized labor refer solely to this city. Chungking was occupied by the Communists on November 30, 1949, and the Preparatory Committee of the Chungking General Trade Union was established on December 27. The committee consisted of 87 members, including representatives of miners, textile workers, telecommunication workers, and workers in other industrial enterprises. The initial tasks of the committee were the restoration of production and the organization of labor in the city. By September 1951, about 90 per cent of the city's 200,000 working population were reported to have joined trade unions.[5] A large part of the Chungking industrial force was working in arsenals in the suburbs of the city. These workers were more tightly controlled by the regime but better paid than

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4. New China Daily, Oct. 9, 1951, p. 2.

5. Ibid., Oct. 1, 1951, p. 5.

467 Movement was initiated there in mid-1951. Prior
668 to the Communist regime, the system of recruitment in construction work and in the mining industry was known as the gang master system. The gang master made a contract with the head engineer or manager of a company to supply labor for certain jobs at a stipulated price. He employed villagers for low wages and pocketed the difference between his payroll and the contract price. According to the Communist press, when the Red Army took Chungking at the end of 1949, the gang labor chiefs infiltrated the labor organization and some of them even pretended to be activists. The Communists assert that in the criticism and self-criticism meetings these gang labor chiefs were discovered and eliminated from the labor organization in Chungking.[11]

IV. LABOR EMULATION AND PRODUCTION

466 Labor emulation is a Communist method
461 for increasing labor productivity without raising production costs. It was practiced in Communist China during the early 1940's in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region.[12] Extended to all China in 1950, the labor emulation drive was stepped up in 1951 after the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War. According to the

11. New China Daily, Oct.10,12,14,1951; and Oct. 2,1952, p. 2.

12. Abundant Clothing; Sufficient Food, Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, May 1944.

466 Communist tenet, labor emulation is a natural
461 and spontaneous expression of the working class when it becomes the leading element in the country and begins to work for its own and national interests.

The responsibility for initiating labor emulation drives rests with the trade union leaders. They develop the campaign by the following stages: (1) the workers are brought together to discuss state production plans; (2) the trade unions, acting on behalf of the workers, then sign collective contracts with the managements of individual factories, mines, or other enterprises; (3) meetings are called to discuss production problems; and (4) the workers are urged to originate and submit "rationalization proposals" [13] and to popularize "advanced methods of work." [14]

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13. In Communist China, the term "rationalization proposals" means proposals submitted by workers to management for increasing production through improved techniques, reducing the cost of production, introducing methods to lengthen the life of machines, and using manpower more efficiently. The submission of rationalization proposals emerged as a campaign in Northeast China in 1947 and spread to all China in 1950. Cf. Kuo-min Ching-chi Shih-yung Ts'u-tien [Popular Dictionary of Practical Economics], Shanghai, 1952, pp. 9016-17.

14. The campaign to popularize "advanced methods of work" is a movement corresponding to Stakhanovism in Russia, a means of increasing the output of workers through publicized competition and the widespread adoption of faster or improved techniques developed by model workers. See Ibid., p. 9057.

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461 Since Southwest China was the last region to be occupied by the Communists, the labor emulation drive began there in 1952, two years after the movement's appearance in the other regions. In the later stage of the drive, emphasis was placed on raising the tehcnical skill of workers instead of lengthening working hours as had been done earlier in the movement. Throughout the region, Communist trade union cadres urged workers to improve working processes and devise more efficient working methods. In September and October 1952, the workers in the iron and steel and cotton textile industries of the whole region were said to have submitted 11,700 rationalization proposals.[15]

There were some reports of increased labor productivity in Southwest China following the inception of the labor emulation drive. They were accompanied by other accounts of an increase in sub-standard and unacceptable products. For instance, in a measuring instruments factory in Chungking, a production contract was signed by the union and management stipulating that if the workers could not fulfill 80 per cent of a fixed quota, there would be a wage cut. As a result, the workers raised their output, and the number of seconds and rejects increased accordingly.[16]

During an emulation drive, workers who showed special initiative and ingenuity in improving their work were accorded the title of "model workers" and given wide publicity. In addition, they received honors and rewards, prior rights to better housing, jobs as teachers of "backward"

15. Workers'Daily, Oct.22,1952, p. 1.
16. New China Daily, Sept. 13, 1952, p. 2.

466 workers, invitations to talk to visitors about
461 their accomplishments, and, occasionally, even tours of foreign countries for propaganda purposes.

V. WAGES AND PURCHASING POWER

465 In order to insure a stable income for the people at a time of wide fluctuation in commodity prices, the Chinese Communists introduced a system whereby workers were paid in wage-units. One wage unit was worth the sum of the retail prices of the following daily necessities,[17] over which the government had control:

Food grain	0.80 catty*/
White cotton cloth	0.20 ch'ih#/
Edible oil	0.05 catty
Salt	0.02 catty
Coal	2.00 catties

*/ One catty = 1.1 lb.
#/ One ch'ih = 1.09 ft.

Southwest China was the last region to adopt the wage-unit system. In October 1952, the money value of the wage-unit in the Southwest region was quoted at 2,158 yuan (old currecy), the lowest quotation in the country. Before the wage-unit system was adopted in this region, workers were paid in "commodity-equivalent" units,[18] which

17. Yangtze Daily, March 11, 1951, p. 2.
18. Commodity-equivalent units were also based on the prices of essential commodities.

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the Korean war, the Chinese workers were urged to make "voluntary" contributions to finance the war. Within three months of 1951, workers in the city of Chungking contributed 13,200,000,000 yuan (old currency).[28]

The Communists have reported an increase in bank savings throughout the whole country. By early May 1954, total savings deposits in cities nationwide were stated to be ten times larger in May 1954 than at the end of 1950. By the end of 1953, savings deposits in the Southwest Region had increased by 7.5 times as compared with 1950. But the increased savings do not necessarily indicate surplus spending power in the hands of the people. Beginning in 1952, the Chinese Communists forced each worker to put 25 to 30 per cent of his income in the People's Bank as compulsory savings to prevent possible inflation and to accumulate capital for national construction.[29] After deducting the "voluntary" contributions and compulsory savings, there is not likely to be money for the workers to spend for other than daily living needs.

VI. LABOR WELFARE

A. Insurance and Health

Under the Labor Insurance Law promulgated by the Communist government in March 1951, 5,380,000 workers throughout China received insurance coverage for death, old age, illness and disability. In the Southwest China Region, there were 163,824 workers, other than railway

28. New China Daily, Oct. 25, 1951, p. 2.
29. Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly], Hong Kong, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 41.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF16

745 and telecommunication employees covered by the insurance law in mid-1952. In the whole region, there were only three large sanitoria, nine rest homes, and 53 crêches established under the provisions of the Labor Insurance Law. The largest sanitoria for workers is located in Nan-wen-ch'üan (Southern Warm Spring), a famous health resort and scenic beauty spot ten miles south of Chungking.

B. Labor Safety and Industrial Accidents

466 The Chinese Communists claim that from 1949 to 1953 the People's Government enacted 119 decrees, rules, and regulations concerning labor safety and sanitation. But there are no indications that any of them has been enforced to any extent. Since the intensification of the labor emulation drive in 1951, the incidence of industrial accidents in Southwest China has been increasing. A report covering the first half of 1952 showed a serious situation. According to the deputy director of the Department of Industry of the Southwest Region,[30] during the first six months of 1952, 3,245 industrial accidents occurred in the region and the accident death rate increased 56.25 per cent over the corresponding period of 1951. From June to August 1952, there were 273 serious industrial accidents reported in Chungking alone. As a result of these disclosures, the municipal government of Chungking issued a directive in September 1952 calling on all responsible parties in the factories and mines of Chungking to follow carefully the labor safety measures and to establish special agencies in each

30. Ibid., January 19, 1953, p. 7.

466 enterprise to supervise the enforcement of safety rules and make detailed reports on industrial accidents. Working conditions were reported to have been improved since the issuance of the directive.[31]

C. Labor Education and Recreation

873 466 At the time the Communists took over Mainland China in 1949, from 60 to 80 per cent of Chinese workers were illiterate (i.e., they could read less than 1,000 Chinese characters). In June 1950, the Government Administration Council issued the "Instructions for Developing Spare-time Education of Workers," a measure aimed at teaching all workers at least 1,000 characters within a period of three to five years and the ability to read simple books and newspapers. The Communist Trade Union Law stipulates that the management or owner of every enterprises must allocate a certain sum for the education of workers. By mid-1952, besides night classes opened in individual factories and mines, there were 652 spare-time schools in the region. "The Quick Method of Learning Chinese Characters" devised by cultural instructor Chi Chien-hua of the People's Liberation Army is lauded as a great help in accelerating the learning process among workers. Workers having a high degree of intelligence are reportedly being sent to universities and technical institutions for advanced study. The

31. New China Daily, Chungking, Sept. 16, 22, 1952, p. 3.

873 Party, unions, and management decide who is qualified for additional technical training. The workers entering schools receive financial support equal to their former wages. The stated intention of the Chinese Communists is to build a new intelligentsia within the working class.

466 In the interest of worker recreation, the Communists reported that 11,929 clubs had been set up in factories, mines and other enterprises throughout the country by the end of 1954. From 1949 to 1952, 348 workers' clubs and 712 libraries were reported to have been established in Southwest China.[32] Workers were encouraged to enjoy their leisure time in these clubs and libraries. But in Communist China, even the "leisure" of the masses is controlled by the Party. After an 8- to 10-hour working day, workers have to participate in political studies, criticism or self-criticism meetings, or various campaigns, movements and drives initiated by the Party. It is doubtful that the Chinese workers have any real leisure time at all.

D. Housing Conditions

362 466 According to a Communist report, People's Government spent more than 286,000,000 yuan (new currency) on housing projects for workers throughout China in 1952. In 1953, the government allocated 130,000,000 square feet of floor space for building workers' living quarters.

32. New China Daily, Sept. 29 and 30, 1953.

362 466 The housing projects for workers of Southwest China have been concentrated in Chungking and Chengtu; the number of units built was far less than in other regions. By March 1953, nine apartment houses with 577 rooms for workers and their families had been built in Chungking. There are no private baths and no private kitchens in these apartments. Only workers in construction and public utilities are eligible to live in these apartments. They rented for 12 wage-units per month (25,890 yuan, about US 1.00).[33] The municipal government of Chengtu completed a housing project for 512 families in April 1953. The whole project consisted of 14,896 square meters of floor space (about 152,534 square feet). Each family occupied about 250 square feet of floor space.[34] Compared with the living standard in pre-Communist China, this is a great improvement, but it benefitted only a small part of the working force.

VII. UNEMPLOYMENT

464 Since the Constitution of Communist China guarantees the right to work to everyone, the Communists maintain that "unemployment" under the new regime is a temporary holdover from the old

33. New China Daily, April 29, 1953, p. 2.
34. Ibid., April 30, 1953, p. 2.

499 reduction of land rent, the return of rental
464 deposits on their land, and a cheap supply of daily necessities to the workers along the construction sites. The methods of recruitment seemed to be effective. Some 38,000 persons answered the call from the eastern part of that province; 30,000 from the southern part, 10,000 from Chengtu and the western part; 6,000 from the northern part; and 22,000 unemployed workers from Chengtun and Chungking also took part in the construction. The total labor force amounted to 104,000 men.[4] After the recruited civilians were organized, they took over the construction job from the army, some members of which were kept to act as office personnel and as an engineering corps.

B. Organization and Living Conditions of the Labor Force

499 The units of the labor organization were
466 formed according to the plan of the projected line, which was divided into 180 sections. Each section was allocated 579 workers. Each group of workers was divided into two shifts. They were formed into small teams according to the character of the work assigned to them. Their

4. Cheng Chu-yüan, Chung-kung ti Nu-kung Chin-tu [Slavery System of the Chinese Communist] Hong Kong, Tzu-ch'u-pan-she, 1952, p. 89.

499 sphere of movement was restricted to within
466 2 li (about 545 yards) on each side of the
● construction line.

499 The recruits were paid according to piece
465 rates, calculated on the basis of the work-day unit. One work-day unit is what an average worker could accomplish in one day. In the case of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway construction, one work-day unit is 2.5 cubic meters (about 81.75 cubic feet) of earthwork. For this amount of work, one worker received seven and one-half catties (about 8.25 lbs.) of rice.[5] In Southwest China, one catty of medium-grade rice was sold for 740 yuan (old currency); one U.S. dollar was worth about 20,000 yuan at the time. Therefore, 7.5 catties of rice would be worth about 27 cents in the United States. With this amount of money per day, the worker had to provide for his food, clothing, and other necessities, not to mention the support of his family.

499 The recruits were required to bring their own tools such as pickaxes and bamboo poles, for railway construction in China depended upon physical labor rather than upon mechanical equipment. Machinery for the laying of tracks was not introduced until the spring of 1954 in building the Pao-chi-Chengtu Line. The workers

5. The World Today, Hong Kong, Oct. 15, 1952, p. 2.

499 on the Chengtu--Chungking Line came to depend upon the primitive tools they brought, or used their bare hands. In their spare time, they were urged to make tools such as bamboo baskets for removing stones and mud. In their letter to Mao Tse-tung from the workers on the Chengtu-Chungking Line, they boasted that they had made and invented several hundred kinds of tools during the period of its construction.[6]

C. Methods Used to Increase the Productivity of Labor

499 466 The Communists used all sorts of emotional appeals to increase productivity. After some activists among the workers had vowed not to go back home until they saw the train running between Chengtu and Chungking, 90 per cent of the builders gave up their New Year's vacation during the first year, and many young workers postponed their wedding dates. Early in 1951, the Communists organized the Three-Systematization and Five-Comparison campaigns among the working teams.[7] Within a period of four months (January to May), in consequence of these

6. New China Daily, Jan. 18, 1952, p. 4.

7. The Three-Systematization Campaign included systematization of thought, of organization, and of rules. The Five-Comparison Campaign included comparison of work, of efficiency, of progress, of safety, and of economy. For details about these movements, see New China Daily, Dec. 8, 1951, p. 2.

499 campaigns, 130,000 "model workers" were
466 elected and labor productivity increased. Taking the standard accomplishment for one work-day as 100 per cent, an average worker at first could fulfill only 25 per cent, but by the end of 1951, this had increased to 150 per cent.[8]

After the Communists entered Korea in November 1950, the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement was instituted in the labor camps along the Chengtu-Chungking Line. The Communists aroused "hate-America" feelings among the workers and kept on telling the workers that the speeding of the construction of the Chengtu-Chungking Line was one way to defeat "American imperialism." The railway workers worked longer hours after being exposed to this propaganda. By the end of 1951, nearly 70 per cent of the entire undertaking had been completed.[9]

In addition to patriotic appeals, the Communists mobilized the workers to organize a Red Flag Campaign. To win the red flag, some members of one labor team worked steadily and slept only 30 hours in a period of 18 days[10] in order to fulfill the assigned task within the time required. One report from a Formosan

8. Wang Chih-fen, op. cit., p. 24.
9. New China Daily, Dec. 8, 1951, p. 2.
10. Ibid., June 22, 26, 1952.

499 source stated that the mortality rate among the 466 workers was as high as 10 per cent at the beginning of construction[11] in 1950, although the Communist press insisted that the workers seemed to think that the harshness of their life was nothing in comparison with what they had achieved. The Communists made the workers believe that they had built a road leading to paradise.[12]

D. Other Railway Construction in Southwest China

499 Since the sites of these railways are the same as the sites of the forced-labor camps, it would be helpful to list those lines under construction or in contemplation in Southwest China.[13]

1. Pao-chi--Chengtu Line connects Pao-chi in Shensi Province and Chengtu in Szechwan Province. The southern section was begun after the completion of the Chengtu-Chungking Line in 1952. As of May 1955 the track-laying

11. Kung-fei K'ung-chih-hsia Ti Szechwan [Szechwan Under the Communist Control], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, the Nationalist Party, Jan. 24, 1955, p. 24.

12. New China Daily, Jan. 18, 1952, p. 4.

13. Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 25-26.

499 Workers and soldiers scaled vertical rock-walls, fought their way across rapids, and crept inch by inch across glaciers, disregarding wind, rain, and snow. Where the laborers worked in Ch'iao-erh-shan Mountain, the altitude was 17,000 feet above sea level, there was snow all year round, and the earth was frozen to a depth of over three feet. The workers built their tents on this hard-frozen floor and made their beds of dry leaves and tree branches. Sometimes they were buried by snow, their tents swept away by avalanches; in one place an avalanche fell every afternoon for five months. One section of the road cut across an immense tract of virgin forest which was cleared by manual labor, although each tree required several days' work by a team of three or four men.

The bridging of the Nu River was said to be the most "heroic" act accomplished by the builders. Both banks rose in sheer precipices about 3,00 feet high, and the current ran 20 feet per second. The point they had chosen for bridging had never been crossed. A group working on the Nu River bridge was completely cut off from its supply line, and the laborers were forced to live on rice gruel for two months before they were rescued.

499 The Communists gave better treatment to
466 the workers on the Sikang-Tibet Highway than to

workers elsewhere, for they did not use such methods as "emulation drives" and "model workers' elections" to speed up work as they did on other projects. On the contrary, the authorities on the Sikang-Tibet Highway prohibited overtime work. The fact that the labor supply was not so abundant in this region and that they could not afford to transport workers from other parts of the country made them more lenient to the laborers on this project.

The Sikang-Tibet highway was opened to traffic by the end of 1954. To travel from Peking to Lhasa once took several months; today the trip can be made in fifteen days.

IV. REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR IN SOUTHWEST CHINA

A Communist report admitted that, in the Southwest Region, of the prisoners convicted through suppression of counterrevolutionaries, through land-reform laws, and Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, 65 per cent had been organized by the end of 1951 into Reform-through-labor corps. They were employed in such heavy work as road-building, house construction, coal mining, collective farming, brick- and tile-manufacturing, and in handicraft industries such as weaving and shoe-making.[19] The size

19. New China Daily, Nov. 8, 1951, p. 2.